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3-- ABSTRACT –
The paper is aimed at analyzing the extent to which monetary policy has
fulfilled its function of ensuring price stability in Romania since 1990, as well as
the medium-term outlook with a view to harmonization with The European
Union (EU) standards. From the quantitative viewpoint, the central bank’s
performance in controlling inflation in Romania was less than modest.
However, the key reason behind this state of affairs is the delay in
implementing the other elements of the reform process, most notably those
related to property and the proper mechanism which enables a performing
market economy to function. During most of the transition period, the
authorities’ policy mix maintained an expansionary stance and the major
imbalances in the economy were treated inconsistently; consequently, monetary
policy only averted a drive into hyperinflation and contained price increases to
the moderate range. Under the circumstances, monetary policy was shunted
onto a branch line and the central bank agreed on a great deal of compromises
that hampered control over inflation.
Meanwhile, the authors end up in identifying an already existing
institutional framework that should pave the way for making good progress at
bringing the price level on course to meet the target for integration with the
EU. Making all this a success is critically conditional on finalization of reform
as regards the other components of the macroeconomic and structural policy
mix, on the one hand, and on central bank’s capability to enhance credibility
and catalyze the necessary political consensus on the other.
4I. INTRODUCTION
1. Monetary policy has captured the attention of both public and political circles in
Romania. Both the role and the performance of monetary policy were seen, to some extent,
through a distorted mirror for endogenous or exogenous reasons related to the monetary
authority. In the absence of profit-oriented economic management (driven by the state
proprietor), enterprises have further regarded monetary policy as an automatic supplier of
financial resources during a well-managed tradition from the socialist economic system. Any
attempt to tighten the monetary conditions was considered to be an anti-economic action. The
behavior exhibited by enterprises was often backed by the double-dealing stance of the
government and the political class – who for most of the past decade failed to put together
public commitments (stabilization and structural reform) – and the evident pattern of their
policies.
2.  The exceedingly critical reaction – of the government in particular – to the quality
of monetary policy was also prompted by the institutional autonomy of the monetary authority
that hindered the government’s unconditional access to the central bank’s resources.
Ultimately, the government proceeded to decisive interventions, in effect canceling the
autonomy of the central bank. At the same time, the limited success of monetary policy in
preventing inflation was attributed to the central bank’s feebleness, as demonstrated during the
long race toward macroeconomic stabilization. The instances of a firm stance on monetary and
foreign exchange policy have been short-lived and therefore insufficient to bear fruit.
3.  Considering the relatively insubstantial track record of monetary policy, the
following major question is legitimate: to what extent can the present monetary and exchange
rate regime in Romania achieve the much-needed macroeconomic stabilization and disinflation
in accordance with a reasonable agenda for integration with the economic structures of the
European Union? Despite the non-convincing performance to date, the authors give credit to
the present monetary regime based on an autonomous central bank and managed floating. In
their analysis, the authors are encouraged by the obvious potential of these monetary and
exchange arrangements to achieve macroeconomic stabilization, and to guide economic policy
in Romania towards the resolution of the chief drawbacks that the economy have faced in the
last couple of years.
4. Chapter II analyzes the institutional framework of monetary policy in particular, and
of the economy in general. The authors conclude that a proper framework was put in place for
the banking system and the central bank. The poor performance of bank privatization and
privatization overall is seen as an obstacle to strengthening monetary policy. Chapter III deals
with the pillars of stabilization. The authors underscore the fact that, poor effectiveness
notwithstanding, monetary policy has remained the main pillar of Romania’s (unfortunately
excessive) macroeconomic stabilization programs. Other potential pillars of stabilization, such
as fiscal, income, or exchange rate policy, are considered as well.
5.  Implementation of the proper operational framework increased, to a large extent,
the capacity of monetary policy to react to the challenge posed by the task of stabilization.
This framework, which includes monetary policy tools, is analyzed in Chapter IV. Assessment
of the performance of monetary policy, covered in Chapter V, reveals both its intrinsic value
and the value to the economic environment and policy coordination. The authors reach the
conclusion that monetary policy proved effective every time it withstood political pressures,
but that this success could not be consolidated.
56.  Finally, Chapter VI deals with the medium-term outlook of monetary policy. The
authors conclude that the favorable foundations already in place and the current momentum of
macroeconomic and structural policies makes it easier for the central bank to achieve the anti-
inflationary goal of monetary policy based on a flexible exchange rate.
6II.  The institutional framework
7. Banking legislation (i.e., the law on the statute of the National Bank of Romania
(NBR) and the Banking Law) has been enforced since the first half of 1991. By and large, the
laws were largely in accordance with the requirements extant in fully-fledged market
economies. The laws lay down the two-tier banking system, the independence of the central
bank, and that the main goal of the latter is price stability.  This effectively contains the
possibility of the central bank financing the budget deficit. Moreover, the central bank is in
charge of elaborating the foreign exchange policy, and regulating and supervising of the
banking system. The first NBR Board, appointed with an 8-year mandate, comprised
unaffiliated personalities that have in time proved to be reform-minded. It is intriguing that,
shortly after being appointed, the Board decided to abolish interest and credit ceilings, thus
clearing the central bank to use indirect mechanisms.
8. The new banking legislation enacted in 1998 – the revised laws on the statute of the
National Bank of Romania and on banking, as well as the new law regarding bank insolvency
– does not bring very many changes. The new statute of the NBR stipulates the following:
Board members are formally required to be unaffiliated; the levers available to the central bank
for supervision of the banking system are strengthened; bankruptcy proceedings for banks are
simplified and enforced. In fact, the present banking laws are almost completely in line with
EU-wide standards and only minor adjustments are needed to render them fully compatible.
9. However, this favorable institutional framework did little to help monetary policy
play its role successfully. The greatest challenge was the de facto limited support of public
authorities to the mechanisms and institutions that enable the smooth functioning of a market
economy. For most of the time, the common attitude assumed, in practice, by many of the
political parties was the gradual approach to reform, with its alleged purpose of ensuring its
social supportability. Thus, price liberalization – the cornerstone of smooth functioning of any
market economy – began in late 1990 but just 80 percent of goods and services witnessed free
prices three years later; the whole process ended no earlier than 1999.
10. Privatization in turn was poorly drafted and developed at a snail’s pace. A voucher
mechanism, similar to the one implemented by the Czech Republic, was adopted in Romania as
well. As in the Czech Republic, the outcome of voucher-based privatization was disappointing
as far as corporate governance is concerned (Nellis, 1999): in Romania it took more than three
years to be completed. As for privatization based on selling the assets officially held by the
State Ownership Fund (SOF), the performance is rather modest; barely one quarter of such
assets were sold by 1999 (Romania – Memorandum of the Government of Romania on
Economic Policies, August 1999).
11. By 1999 restitution of property seized by the communist regime was not
concluded. The farming land was partly reconveyed in the early 1990’s. Subsequently, part of
real property was also reconveyed. The retrocession of industrial property, as well as some
other agricultural and real property, remains a point of contention between political parties and
can no longer be handled by mere procedure. Romania took a one-off position among the
former socialist countries, since it did not settle properly the question of legal redress once and
for all. Aside from moral issues, the current state of affairs adds to the confusion and, if
anything, delays the reform process.
12. Legislation on market functioning has several important flaws. The first law on
bankruptcy was enforced only in 1995; the fact that it avoids usage of the word bankruptcy is
7puzzling, given the overall direction of economic policy. Moreover, the provisions of the law
are bureaucratic and hamper de facto the process of forcing bankrupt companies out of the
system. Generally speaking, the way in which the economic legislation and the specific
jurisprudence were drafted shows that quite frequently the debtor is defended to the detriment
of the creditor (Annual Report of the National Bank of Romania – 1998). The above-
mentioned state of affairs was favorable to the emergence of moral hazard and adverse
selection.
13. In turn, labor legislation has not been harmonized with market-economy standards.
Staff cuts, albeit economically justified, are difficult to enforce due to legislative rigidities. All
this led to the emergence of a double standard. On one hand, unions in the state-controlled
enterprises took advantage of the already outdated legal provisions to block restructuring, and
one the other hand some of the newly-established private enterprises would violate laws on a
large scale.
14. The institutional structure of the banking system, though built on correct
principles, also accommodated the overall orientation of the authorities. Thus, the leading
state-owned banks fulfilled quasi-fiscal functions, while some of the private banks evinced
major weaknesses in corporate governance. All this resulted in a fragile banking system that
failed to perform its resource allocation function properly.
15. The performance of the stock exchange and of other financial institutions was even
poorer than that of the banking system. The Bucharest Stock Exchange started operations no
earlier than 1995 and, except for a short-lived boom in 1997, it played only a marginal part in
resource allocation, since the volume of trades and market capitalization were extremely low.
Nor did the over-the-counter market, the RASDAQ (established similarly to the NASDAQ),
succeed in living up to expectations. Operators seem to take little interest in the prospective
advantages of commodity markets that were established here and there across the country. It
should be pointed out that Romania, which used to be (and could become again) a large grain
exporter, has yet to establish a grain exchange. The aforesaid phenomenon brought about
market segmentation and lack of transparency in setting prices, and therefore deterred
production in spite of Romania’s bountiful natural assets. The government has granted
subsidies for outdated farming methods instead of boosting a competition-driven agricultural
policy.
16. Therefore, the institutional framework remained less favorable, if not hostile, to
reform in the economy in general and to an anti-inflationary stance of monetary policy in
particular. Besides, the public – lacking a historic memory of a painful inflation-plagued
period, such as Germany’s memory of inflation in the early 1920’s – were not very willing to
suffer the constraints required for an anti-inflationary policy, thereby depressing the central
bank’s capacity to pursue such a policy. In time, the institutional framework was partially
improved, but these changes came in a stop-and-go pattern. This inconsistency actually
hampered progress at times, generating a general perception that the costs of the reform
appear to be higher than its benefits and inducing a crisis of confidence in the authorities’
policies. For instance, slow price liberalization entailed a persistently high inflation rate and
severely undermined the performance of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
17. Good progress in each of the previously mentioned areas was not made until this
year. Price liberalization was eventually concluded, the first drastic measures were taken to
improve the health of the banking system, privatization was put on a fast track, and economic
legislation became less favorable to debtors, thereby helping to strengthen corporate
8governance. It remains to be seen whether, when put into practice, the improved institutional
framework will provide the foundation needed not only to step up reform but to yield positive
results in the economy, thus enhancing public support for advancing the process.
9III. Anchors of stabilization
18. The above-mentioned institutional framework has seriously limited the central
bank’s discretion in elaborating monetary policy. The poor adherence to the institutional
structures and to the policies with steadfast anti-inflationary orientations forced the central
bank to choose between two second-best solutions: either to stick to its mandate or agree on
tradeoffs. Although the first option appears to be the optimal one, the lack of support from
other policies diluted the central bank’s credibility and ended in failure. This emerged
strikingly in Romania in 1991. Following conclusion of the first arrangement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the central bank had followed exactly, for nine months,
the agreed monetary program aimed at containing price increases. Unfortunately, the lack of
other economic measures backing this objective actually detached the monetary mechanisms
from the evolution of the economy as a whole. Monetary tightening was circumvented by a
dramatic increase in money velocity and by the mechanism of arrears (Dãianu, 1994, UN/EEC,
1999), both of them accelerating the rise in prices throughout 1991 without affecting wage
and salary payment. In time, the belief grew more firm that the monetary policy is  not viable
and that its restrictive stance will eventually be abandoned. In the long run, it is less important
that monetary loosening was the follow-up to a law enacted by Parliament, which stipulated
the complete and unconditional monetization of arrears, rather than the result of a decision
made by the central bank. In the absence of support from other policies, the limitations of
monetary policy were brought to the fore1.
19. The alternative is to avoid major disruptions relative to the other components of
economic policy. Such an approach translates into setting less ambitious targets or, frankly
speaking, translates into tradeoffs in setting the objectives and their attainment. After its failure
in the fall of 1991, monetary policy embarked on the aforesaid path until 1999. This was the
main driver of large swings in inflation rates, highlighting the stop-and-go pattern of
macroeconomic policies. The central bank’s tradeoffs gradually sapped its credibility and
contributed to a much higher inflation rate than that of other Central European countries.
However, the central bank progressively ushered in mechanisms and working procedures to
gear monetary policy, signaling beyond any doubt its reform-oriented approach. The public at
large understood the message and eventually gave the central bank credit for a better
performance than that justified by the actual result of monetary policy, i.e., the inflation rate.
20. In assessing the performance in controlling inflation we should not lose sight of the
fact that the anchors used to this end proved insufficient or even misleading. Thus, the use of
broad money (M2) appeared to be more reliable as an intermediary target than, say, the
monetary base, owing to weaknesses in the transmission mechanism, at the outset of transition
at least. Admittedly, between 1991 and 1994, the NBR used M2 as an intermediary objective,
aiming at a money supply growth lower than that of nominal GDP in an effort to stifle
inflationary pressures. As a matter of fact, money velocity posted a swift increase because of
the lack of credibility of the authorities’ policy mix, decline in money illusion, and persistence
                                                  
1
 The Republic of Moldova in another case in which monetary policy attempted to pursue its objectives by
making no tradeoffs, and Moldova succeeded in doing so for a longer period than Romania. The National
Bank of Moldova enjoyed a legal framework much the same as the one in Romania while, in retrospect, reform
in the economy proceeded even more slowly than it did in Romania. However, inflation was kept under control
by using almost exclusively monetary levers. But soon enough arrears took hold of wage and salary payments
and reached endemic proportions – it was just one of the reasons behind moderate inflation rates. The central
bank’s stance alone was not enough to improve the policy mix and the lack of structural reforms materialized
in a fragile external position and subsequently in high inflation.
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of pseudo-liquidity in the form of arrears. Although money supply growth lagged behind
nominal GDP growth, the previously noted factors prevented system liquidity from stoking
price increases (Table 1). Moreover, starting in 1992, preferential and directed credits were
granted by resorting to money creation; as a result, liquidity was running high. Excess money
creation crimped household saving. Usually, in times of financial repression, mushrooming
banks chase cheap funds from households (McKinnon, 1973, Show, 1973). This did not occur
in Romania. Therefore, at the end of 1993 (the year to see the highest inflation rate ever,
combined with the least convincing performance as far as reform is concerned), household
savings at banks, other than CEC (the Savings House), covered barely 0.7 percent of the
credit to the non-government sector, while refinancing from the NBR accounted for 46.3
percent of these credits (Rãdulescu, 1999).
M.U. 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
M2 (annual average) lei bn. 604 1,210 2,764 6,652 13,108 22,219 45,116 70,212
Nominal GDP lei bn. 2,204 6,029 20,036 49,773 72,136 108,920 250,480 338,670
Money velocity rotations 4 5 7 7 6 5 6 5
Table 1. Money velocity, 1991 - 98
21. The exchange rate lamentably failed as an anti-inflationary anchor in Romania.
Several attempts were made in this respect, with some intermissions, throughout the period
1990-1996. The reasons behind this state of affairs were ultimately linked to the lack of both
monetary and extra-monetary conditions to render such an anchor credible and therefore
effective. First, the exchange rate target was from the very start unrealistic, much overvalued
in comparison to the market-determined level. Second, the monetary conditions – high
liquidity, low interest rates – were the opposite of those deemed compatible when using the
said anchor. Consequently, the nominal stability of the exchange rate – achieved anyway
through rather “unorthodox” methods – was rightly perceived as unsustainable by operators
who upped prices in order to make up for the losses likely to be caused by future depreciation.
Thus, the direct effect induced by the nominal stability of costs of imported components was
annihilated by the indirect effect of inflation expectations. The result of administratively
induced stability of the exchange rate was the worsening balance of payments, protraction of
market segmentation, and lack of transparency. The relatively long period during which these
phenomena were discernible engendered a marked hysteria: even if the authorities had fulfilled
every condition for the successful use of the exchange rate as an anti-inflationary anchor, its
dismal performance prior to 1996 severely eroded its credibility for the next few years at least.
22. The National Bank of Romania did not use the interest rate as an anchor between
1990 and 1999. The money illusion that lasted until 1992-1993, the lack of political support,
and the extremely uncertain transmission mechanism against the backdrop of soft budget
constraints warranted this approach. Nor did other countries in transition use this anchor
because there was not enough theoretical support for its use under the given circumstances.
23. Other macroeconomic policies failed as anti-inflationary anchors, even when they
appeared to be satisfactory. Thus, fiscal policy definitely fell short of standards of transparency
and proceeded at a snail’s pace. While the consolidated public deficit recorded low values (an
annual average of 1.8 percent during 1990-1998), the quasi-fiscal deficit was very high,
mirroring the expansionary fiscal policy. Several authors studied the mechanisms underlying
the quasi-fiscal deficit and made quantitative appraisals of this phenomenon (Dãianu, 1999,
Croitoru, Rãdulescu, 1999). Even though the appraisal methods were different, the
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conclusions were similar: the deficits widened to as much as 20 percent of GDP in 1991 and
1992, and progressively narrowed to 5-10 percent of GDP in most of the subsequent years.
The quasi-fiscal deficit was nothing but the symptom of delay in implementing reform at the
microeconomic level and the main buffer for the repeated attempts of monetary policy to grow
tighter.
24. Fiscal policy was also slack from the operational viewpoint. No government
securities were issued until 1993 as the deficit was financed from extra-budgetary funds (such
as the supplementary pension fund, the unemployment compensation fund, etc.). Public debt
instruments developed slowly even afterwards. In 1999, there is still no liquid and deep
secondary market for government securities, and financing of public debt uses almost solely T-
bills or foreign borrowings. This state of affairs added more uncertainty to the interest rate
mechanism in the market and increased the cost of financing the public debt whenever
monetary policy tightened, especially in 1997 and in 1999.
25. To put an end to the list of inflationary policies, we will briefly refer to income
policy. The overall impact should have been favorable to disinflation, since wage indexation
was below par and based on forward-looking inflation. Instead, wage policy stood out as one
of the most powerful inflationary factors until late 1998. First, unlike most of the countries in
transition, in Romania wage and salary payment was viewed as taboo and represented the key
function of state-controlled enterprises. Second, collective bargaining took the performance of
output into consideration only marginally, and unions across industry seemed to have great
influence. This explains why some of the most inefficient state-owned sectors, such as mining
and metallurgy, paid some of the highest wages at the expense of either subsidies or arrears.
These developments led to higher resistance to reform mechanisms and helped perpetuate
inefficient resource allocation. At the macroeconomic level, the signals conveyed by income
policy are somewhat less clear. Real average wage per person declined until 1994, and again in
1997, but increased in the other years under review. Nonetheless, the unit labor cost that rose
every year until 1994 moved slightly lower in 1995-1996 and soared in 1998. The wage
indexation policy was eventually abandoned starting in the fall of 1998; thus, provided that
budget constraints became effective, income policy could entail anti-inflationary effects.
26. Hence, the potential anchors of a stabilization program frequently led to opposite
results. If we consider the knock-on effect, which also impacted credibility as a result of
prevalently inflationary policies pursued by the authorities, one would have expected that the
inflation rate, which had been in the three-digit range for many years now, might turn into
hyperinflation. Several factors prevented this. First was the external imbalance, which was
likely to have a certain impact during the entire period. The external current account deficit
triggered by the considerable trade deficit widened to as much as 5 percent of GDP during
most of the transition period. Real foreign resources boosted aggregate supply and produced
anti-inflationary effects.
27. Another factor detectable in the first years of transition was the persistence of a
relatively strong money illusion fueled by decades of fixed prices. Households, the main holder
of liquidity in 1990, were therefore slow to react to the weakening of the currency and
incurred tremendously high losses through inflation tax. Thus, in 1990, during the first stage of
price liberalization, the losses suffered by households virtually overnight was equivalent to
10.2 percent of GDP. In 1991, value transfer accounted for 11.4 percent of GDP, while in
1992 it equaled 5.3 percent of GDP due to a much lower level of monetization of the economy
(Rãdulescu, 1999). The fact that individuals could not identify more readily the means to deal
with inflation provided the authorities with some room for maneuver and cushione
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substantially the inflationary pressures likely to be induced by an all-round money flight in the
early stages of price liberalization.
28. The third factor that helped avoid hyperinflation consisted in the improvement of
economic policies, although this process was uneven and unfolded much more slowly than in
most of the other countries in transition. Monetary policy, to which we shall refer below,
played an essential part. Fiscal policy also improved. Thus, 1993 saw the introduction of value
added tax, which replaced the former turnover tax. The State Treasury was also commissioned
in 1993, thereby putting a halt to the financing of public expenditures via issues by the central
bank. Later on, the spread in which quasi-fiscal deficits were created narrowed considerably,
so that, overall, fiscal policy became less expansionary. Income policy developed in a rather
expansionary fashion, with relatively few anti-inflationary episodes, the most significant being
that of 1997.
29. Finally, enterprise restructuring also played its part, due mostly to privatization and
enhanced corporate governance in the private sector (which accounted for 62 percent of GDP
in 1998). At the same time, even the not-yet-privatized sectors were subject to adjustment
(Hunya, 1999), which occurred chiefly spontaneously, under the pressure of market
mechanisms and exhaustion of the available financing resources.
30. Even if, in retrospect, the improvement of both policies and the institutional
framework is clear, it occurred rather unevenly, hesitantly and even took a few steps
backward, thereby dampening its credibility as well as the overall economic picture. It is worth
mentioning that, in 1998, the GDP in Romania equaled a mere 76 percent of the 1989 figure,
while the countries that implemented the reform earlier and more thoroughly achieved a gross
domestic product higher than that of 1989.
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IV. Monetary policy tools
31. The National Bank of Romania abolished direct control over credit and interest
rates for good. Ceilings on credits were removed and interest rates liberalized as early as
September 1991. Control over monetary expansion was subsequently exercised by means of
the refinance credit and reserve requirements. Ever since 1997, refinance credits have lost their
active role, so the National Bank of Romania proceeded to make use of open market
operations.
32. The NBR sought to render monetary policy tools more flexible and therefore
reduce progressively the maturity of credits granted, from three months for structural credits
to (usually) one week for auction credits and overnight for Lombard credits. However,
although a mechanism to control liquidity relying on structural, auction, and Lombard credits
was put in place back in 1991, both standardization and the impact on the development of a
genuine money market remained unsatisfactory. In addition, open market operations, which
were first applied in 1997, are taking place on an ad hoc basis, and the market continues to be
scarcely liquid and is less efficient.
- daily average -
M.U. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999*
Structural credit 1) lei bn. 121.9 306.2 1,156.5 1,308.1 1,398.0 1,211.9 – – 
% 34.9 37.2 55.6 52.6 34.2 50.6 – – 
Preferential 
 credit 2) lei bn. 162.7 303.4 108.0 47.3 6.8 3.4 1.0 0.2
% 46.6 36.9 5.2 1.9 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0
Auction credit lei bn. 61.8 156.6 734.9 855.1 823.6 223.0 – – 
% 17.7 19.0 35.3 34.4 20.1 9.3 – – 
Special credit 3) lei bn. 1.2 2.7 2.3 153.3 728.7 80.7 – 4,381.3
% 0.3 0.3 0.1 6.2 17.8 3.4 – 88.8
Lombard credit 4) lei bn. 1.4 54.3 77.8 122.5 217.8 26.0 5.8 – 
% 0.4 6.6 3.7 4.9 5.3 1.1 1.0 – 
Credit granted with 
a derogation lei bn. – – – – 914.5 752.7 521.2 503.1
% – – – – 22.4 31.4 89.9 10.2
Non-directed  
structural credit lei bn. – – – – – 56.0 – – 
% – – – – – 2.3 – – 
Credit granted 
according to 
Law 135/1996
lei bn. – – – – – 43.6 52.0 52.0
% – – – – – 1.8 9.0 1.1
Total refinancing lei bn. 349.0 823.1 2,079.4 2,486.2 4,089.4 2,397.3 579.9 4,936.6
Note:  Percentage as weight of total refinancing.
1) Credit lines until July 31, 1995. 2) Special credit until July 31, 1995. Credits extended at interest rate lower than the
    refinancing interest rate or credits on which the interest is not encashed at least once a month.
3) Fixed-term credit until July 31, 1995. 4) Overdraft credit until July 31, 1995.  *) June.
Table 2. Composition of refinancing, 1992-99*
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33. The emergence of direct credits, with or without preferential interest rates,
hindered the construction of monetary policy tools in line with European standards. Such
credits emerged in late 1992, shortly after the NBR’s first attempt to bring interest rates to
real positive levels in order to achieve stabilization of the economy. Such credits were further
granted until the end of 1996, leading to grave consequences for reform in general and for the
sound development of the banking system in particular. The volume of direct credits and the
size of the implicit subsidies posted ups and downs that mirrored precisely the trends in
reform. The very existence of directed credits brought to the fore the de facto limitations on
the central bank’s independence in elaborating monetary policy.
34. Economic literature examines at length the confinancing of subsidization, notably
through directed credits, which have an adverse impact on the basic equilibria across the
economy. In addition, another effect of directed credits in Romania is the high direct costs,
while the potential favorable effects are practically non-existent. Most likely, this state of
affairs was at least partly due to widespread diversion of directed credits from their original
destination. Actually, the sectors that benefited most from directed credits in dubious
circumstances, agriculture and the energy sector, saw their performance worsen steadily and
just delayed the restructuring, thereby rendering their inevitable shake-up more and more
difficult. In addition, the two main state-owned banks involved in preferential lending to the
aforesaid sectors, Bancorex and Banca Agricolã, were severely “contaminated” by the
implications of directed credits both due to the large share of these credits, which became non-
performing, and the dramatic deterioration of corporate governance of these banks.
35. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the central bank voiced publicly its
reservations about the efficiency of directed credits, but neither the political parties nor the
public at large listened to it. In order to contain the effects of directed credits, the NBR
resorted to the reserve requirement mechanism and made more extensive use of auction
credits. The latter stood out as a fine-tuning mechanism – its use smoothed the way for the
change of the operational objective of monetary policy (in 1997, broad money was replaced by
reserve money).
     M.U. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
lei bn. 284.6 609.6 1,264.5 1,355.3 2,319.4 2,011.6 574.1
as % in total 
refinancing 81.6 74.1 60.8 54.5 56.7 83.9 99.0
as % in total credit 
to non-gov't 14.9 12.4 13.3 8.2 8.6 5.6 1.0
as % in GDP 4.7 3.0 2.5 1.9 2.1 0.8 0.2
Table 3. Directed credits and subsidies
36. Open market operations were initiated later and played a merely marginal role until
1999, due to the confluence of several factors, the most important being the low domestic
public debt. The government was a net creditor to the banking system until 1992. From that
point on the accumulation of public debt slowed down, due to both low fiscal deficits (as the
quasi-fiscal was definitely not reflected by government accounts) and high inflation rates,
which whittled down the stock of public debt as long as interest rates remained negative in real
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terms. Another factor was the Finance Ministry’s poor appetite for financing the deficit by
using standardized market tools (government securities) that might have driven, at least in the
beginning, a rise in costs linked to domestic public debt. Moreover, the quasi-permanent
excess liquidity on the money market limited the central bank’s capacity to purchase
government securities from the secondary market, although they had begun trading on the
primary market.
37. Interest rates played a relatively modest part among the NBR’s tools and in the
allocation of resources to the real economy. Maintenance of a marked money illusion in the
first years of transition, and protraction of the habit to allot resources directly by means of
directed credits in the next few years, both contributed to this state of affairs. Interest rates
stayed highly negative in real terms until the end of 1993, but turned to real positive levels
thereafter, and began to play their own part in the economic operators’ decisions on resource
allocation. All the same, the signaling role of interest rates was not coherent enough during the
period under review, mostly due to Romania’s unpredictable inflation rate and the fledgling
money market. Therefore both lending and deposit rates varied within a large spread. For
instance, in the last quarter of 1993, lending rates ranged from 15 percent per annum on
directed credits destined to agriculture to 250 percent on overnight Lombard credits granted
by the NBR to commercial banks.
38. Interest rate developments suffered the adverse impact of protraction of directed
credits until 1996.  They have since remained very sensitive because of the repeated stop-and-
go experiments during reform implementation in Romania in general, and the fluctuating
inflation rate in particular. In fact, there were three moments in which disruptions in reform
implementation led to inflation flare-ups: in the summer of 1992 (when the success of reform
was short-lived), in 1996 (during the run-up to the elections), and between October 1997 and
August 1998. Each time, lack of coordination of economic policies triggered the subsequent
acceptance of increasingly high real rates, which otherwise stood for the premium for lost
credibility. This was the main driver of extremely high real rates throughout 1999, thereby
impeding resumption of economic growth because of prohibitive lending costs. This is yet
more proof of the high price that has to be paid for the half-hearted reform process of the past
decade.
39. Under the present circumstances, the National Bank of Romania was not in the
position to consider interest rates as an anchor of monetary policy. It took a long time and
plenty of effort on behalf of the central bank to make the public understand the importance of
having real-positive interest rates, since under central planning interest rates were assigned no
part at all, and at the start of the transition period their sole effect was on production costs,
while the impact on aggregate demand was simply ignored.
40. The use of the exchange rate as a monetary policy tool was severely hampered by
political interests despite the fact that, formally, elaboration of foreign exchange policy was the
prerogative of the National Bank of Romania. As a matter of fact, the successive failures in
implementing the economic policy were soon reflected by depreciation of the home currency
on the free market, regardless of the authorities’ voluntary options. For most of the 1991-1996
period, the exchange rate was seen as a political objective instead of a monetary policy tool. In
time, despite the inauspicious conditions, the NBR successfully completed a series of ground-
breaking reforms: abolition of multiple rates on the regulated market controlled by the
authorities (in November 1991), adoption of the full retention mechanism (in May 1992), de
facto liberalization of the interbank auction sessions (in April 1994), and commissioning of the
full-fledged forex market (in August 1994). However, the forex market remained largely
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segmented until the end of 1996, with an overvalued official rate, virtually not recognized by
the market. Over the years, the instances when reform was frozen concurred with blockage of
the exchange rate under the government’s relentless pressures, thereby highlighting the de
facto limitations on the central bank’s independence. The forex market has been operating free
of constraints ever since 1997, the exchange rate has been determined consistent with the
demand/supply mechanism, market segmentation ceased to exist and so did the multiple
exchange rates. The latest momentous achievement in this respect was the official acceptance
of the provisions of Article VIII in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement (March 1998). In light of
political constraints and the relatively recent negative experience of the public at large, the
National Bank of Romania could not contemplate the use of the exchange rate as a tool of
monetary policy, and has used it solely as the means to confirm the consistency of monetary
policy.
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V. Assessment of monetary policy
41. A mere black-and-white assessment of the behavior of monetary policy would be,
in our opinion, both inaccurate and useless in the attempt to draft an outlook for the future.
Monetary policy cannot be analyzed separately from the other elements of the macroeconomic
policy mix, for viable accomplishment of the final goal of monetary policy is critically
conditional on the basic equilibria in the economy. From this angle, it would have been more
important that the policy mix pursued by the authorities firmly addressed the major imbalances
confronting the economy. For many years, the targets were unrealistic and their means
conflicting.
- percent -
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999*
M2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   M1 67.4 55.4 49.9 42.6 38.8 36.8 30.1 23.9 21.7 
       Currency outside
       banks 17.3 22.2 23.4 20.7 20.6 17.7 14.8 12.5 13.4 
       Demand deposits 1)       50.2 33.2 26.4 21.9 18.2 19.1 15.3 11.4 8.3 
   QUASI-MONEY 32.6 44.6 50.1 57.4 61.2 63.2 69.9 76.1 78.3 
       Household savings        25.3 22.0 14.4 25.6 28.1 29.0 32.4 33.5 29.2 
       Time and restricted
       deposits (lei) 3.3 4.7 6.7 9.7 10.5 10.8 9.0 10.0 11.5 
       Residents' deposits in 
       hard currency 3.9 17.9 29.0 22.1 22.6 23.4 28.5 32.6 37.6 
Pro memoria : Money velocity (based on annual average) - rotations -
M1 7.1 8.3 13.8 17.6 14.6 13.9 20.2 19.4
 …
M2 3.7 5.0 7.3 7.5 5.5 4.9 5.6 4.8
 …
Note:
 Since December 1992, foreign banks' branches have been included.
1) Until December 1991, it also included corporate deposits. *) August.
Table 4. Composition of broad money, 1991-99*
42. It is difficult to make a hierarchy of the factors seen as major obstacles to rendering
monetary policy efficient. Although the only available anchor was the monetary one, its
efficient use was hurt by the ever-changing, unpredictable developments of the demand for
money. The trends developed by the latter were the following: decline in times of confused
policies, and slow recovery following improved policies. Owing to the prevalence of stop-and-
go policies in Romania, the demand for money fluctuated and attempts at econometric
formalization of money demand developments failed to yield conclusive results (Bo_el, 1996;
Popa, 1997).
43. From another viewpoint, commencing in 1991 broad money composition
underwent a relatively significant shift from the liquid components such as M1 to less liquid
ones that provide better protection against the effects of inflation. On one hand this evolution
points to a maturation of market operators. On the other hand, it leaves open the discussion on
monetary indicators that are closely linked to inflation. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the
growth rate of narrow money lagged behind the annual inflation rate, pinpointing that
monetary policy was tighter than the analysis of broad money shows.
44. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy was affected by several factors in
turn, the most important of which appear to be the following: price liberalization, enterprise
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restructuring, and financial sector problems (Begg, 1998). The chief constraint was the major
difficulty of achieving price liberalization and economic stabilization simultaneously, since the
supply-side shock induced by the former concurs with disinflation measures affecting mainly
the demand and sows confusion (Blanchard, 1998, quoted in Begg, 1998). Most notably, price
liberalization in Romania covered more than eight years and protracted the period of conflict
between stabilization and liberalization. In addition, the lingering price liberalization sparked
inflation expectations that impeded the effectiveness of disinflationary efforts.
45. Snail’s-pace enterprise restructuring produced an adverse selection effect, however
paradoxical it may appear. Monetary policy tightening had an asymmetric effect on the
enterprises’ behavior. While small-sized enterprises, private ones as well, were hit by the
crowding-out effect on the credit market, large enterprises, primarily state-owned enterprises,
made increased resort to resources. Popa (1996) identifies, by using empirical means, a
positive correlation between mounting rates and the resort to credit of large enterprises,
confirming the non-existence of budget constraints on these enterprises. In addition, access to
resources by industries that were granted directed credits helped strengthen the effect of
resource allocation on less efficient sectors. With this in view, the central bank faced a major
dilemma: either promote stabilization through monetary stimuli evenly sent to the economy but
heavily distorted by the above-mentioned mechanism, or follow a rather accommodating
policy, which does not generate adverse selection, but definitely leads to rampant inflation.
46. The third important factor that distorted the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy was the functioning of the financial system itself. The quality of the inherited portfolio
plagued the old state-owned banks, and some of them even became victims of their debtors. In
addition, the quasi-fiscal activities imposed by the authorities through the policy of preferential
lending made things worse. The newly-incorporated banks suffered from an insufficiently
consolidated institutional culture, and the quality of their portfolios worsened following the
dismal performance of the economy as a whole and, in some cases, inadequate corporate
governance. Above all, the repeated attempts to achieve macro-stabilization had a negative
impact particularly on the quality of banks’ loan portfolios. Until 1998, the Ministry of Finance
had not certified the right to tax rebates on risk provisions set up by banks, thereby increasing
the taxation burden; this illustrates the conflict of interest between short-term objectives of
fiscal policy and the long-term objectives of macroeconomic policy. The relatively weak
financial position of most banks stymied both financial deepening due to large interest rate
spreads and the overall operation of the interbank market.
47. The government’s incessant intervention in foreign exchange policy limited the de
facto decision-making capability of the National Bank of Romania. However, the headway
made during the past years – see paragraph 32 – succeeded in achieving a rational and
sustainable foreign exchange policy in 1997. Nonetheless, the tradeoffs made for so long and
the setbacks in forex market liberalization had serious consequences both for the overall
effectiveness of macroeconomic policies and Romania’s credibility vis-à-vis prospective
foreign investors. Acceptance of multiple rates and overvaluation of the official exchange rate
worsened the balance of payments and perpetuated the lack of transparency in the interface
between Romania and the world, causing inter alia further dysfunction of the price mechanism
and implicitly an unjust allocation of resources. It is therefore impossible to use the exchange
rate as an anchor for disinflation at least for several years to come. The National Bank of
Romania’s stance in building up the foreign exchange policy, though justified by exogenous
factors, represents irrefutable proof of mismanagement.
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48. All the above bring us to the conclusion that monetary policy operated in a hostile
environment and, frankly speaking, the performance it might have achieved in curbing inflation
could not have been too impressive. The central bank has quite resolutely sought to create the
tools to use once a more favorable institutional and macroeconomic framework is in place. For
every time restructuring programs were initiated, monetary policy measures led the way not
only because they were naturally in the forefront of macroeconomic stabilization but also
because the central bank already had adequate tools in store. However, the reform-oriented
approach of monetary policy remained solitary several times, since every other measure
included in the program could not be implemented either due to political constraints or to the
feeble support of public authorities.
49. One of the major disturbing factors was the almost permanent discrepancy between
fiscal and monetary policy. Such behavior is the more so regrettable as it brings about an
overall weaker economic performance. Thus, a lax fiscal policy would require a tighter
monetary policy, even though the latter cannot fully make up for the taxation shortfall.
Moreover, the lack of credibility stemming from the long-term inconsistency of such a policy
mix can only dampen the effectiveness of monetary policy. Efficient coordination requires that
each of the two policies be sustainable. For the stabilization of anticipation on monetary policy
to be successful, fiscal policy should support the same. On the contrary, a tight monetary
policy leads to sky-high interest rates, undermining from the very start the credibility attached
to the central bank’s capability to pursue such a policy in the long run. Admittedly,
coordination should allow for the fact that adjustments to fiscal policy operate on a different
timetable than that of monetary policy. The latter can be adjusted virtually on a daily basis,
which is why it bears the burden of fine-tuning stabilization policies (Laurens and De la Piedra,
1998).
50. Romania did not fulfill the above-mentioned requirements in the least. Although
the government aimed to keep the public deficit under control, at the same time it indulged in
and even encouraged massive quasi-fiscal deficits to be borne largely by some state-owned
banks or the central bank itself. The construction of monetary policy has been overburdened
by quasi-fiscal activities imposed on the central bank in basically every year since 1991. These
activities resulted in net credits from monetization of arrears, accounting for more than one-
half of the monetary base in December 1991 – i.e. subsidized-credits (between 1992 and 1996,
topping 80 percent of total refinancing in the spring of 1993) and structural credits extended
to cash-strapped banks (Dacia Felix and Credit Bank in 1996, Banca Agricolã and Bancorex in
1997 and 1999). In most of these cases, the related quasi-fiscal costs were eventually
accounted for as fiscal costs. All the same, fiscal policy had by then transferred the burden
onto monetary policy in a non-transparent manner. The central bank did not take a firm
enough stand against this behavior, so the real source of these challenges remains questionable
and efforts to reach a lasting solution were delayed.
51. The impact of trade policy on the macroeconomic policy mix in general and on
monetary policy in particular was less discussed publicly, though, as shown below, it was not
negligible. For most of the reviewed period, trade policy in Romania achieved weaker-than-
expected results. The policy of imports was overly protectionist; Romania’s customs policy
was, if anything, one of the most ineffectual among the transition countries, and its managers
can be blamed inter alia for a risky lack of transparency verging on hazard. Calculations show
that during 1991-1998 the average value of customs duties applied in Romania reached nearly
4.65 percent (CIF) of total imports. Meanwhile, bureaucracy and lack of stimulation
mechanisms plagued export policy. Boosting imports and hindering exports is a less common
trade policy elsewhere in the world. However, the Romanian authorities have clung to such a
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policy under the impression, not always admitted, that cheap imports cushion inflationary
pressures and leave room for restructuring the economy (Rãdulescu, 1996a and 1996b). Trade
policy therefore worsened the most menacing imbalance of the economy, the external
imbalance, the recovery of which ultimately depended on the NBR’s foreign exchange policy.
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VI. Monetary policy options
52. Construction of a framework for the monetary policy in the medium term should be
grounded on the restrictions imposed by the developments to date, on the one hand, and on
the stated target of the Romanian authorities of integration with the EU approved by all
political parties, on the other. Continuation of the disinflationary process should be maintained
as the key objective of monetary policy, aimed at curbing the inflation rate to the mid-single
digit range (5-6 percent) on an annual basis in the next five to seven years. Both the use of
monetary tools and the elaboration of a policy mix backed by the attendant institutional
development should help achieve this objective. Such a stance rests on the authors’ belief,
similar to that of other authors (see Cottarelli a. o., 1998, Coorey a. o., 1996, Dãianu, 1994)
that in Romania, like in other transition countries, the inflationary process has not only
monetary causes, therefore it cannot be addressed by using monetary policy alone. Besides,
the time horizon suggested by the authors hinges chiefly on the fact that lasting success in
curbing and keeping inflation at bay is critically dependent on components other than monetary
policy, the structural ones in particular, whose construction takes time.
53. The first and, most likely, utmost issue the central bank must dwell on is to ensure
the support of both the public at large and policy makers for the implementation of consistent
anti-inflationary policies. It should be mentioned that apparently viable sectoral policies
ignored the restrictions on available resources, so the macroeconomic environment was
ultimately plagued by either inflation or external imbalance, or by a combination of the two. In
order to be successful, the central bank should take a more firm public stand and refuse
tradeoffs, which not only delay the reform process, but also tarnish the credibility of monetary
policy.
54. Construction of the policy mix should start with improvement of fiscal policy. First
and foremost, this implies preclusion by any means of quasi-fiscal deficits and containment of
the fiscal deficit to a level that can be financed without stoking inflation. In view of the low
monetization of the economy and the still fledgling financial markets, the authorities should
aim to maintain a primary surplus and reduce the total deficit to about 2 percent of GDP or
less next year. This behavior could annihilate the crowding out effect of the private sector and
could enable a lowering of interest rates to a level that may induce resumption of a sound
economic recovery. Without going into details outside the scope of this paper, we think that
improvement of fiscal performance can be achieved by means of the following: eliminating red
tape in central and local government; phasing out subsidies to unviable sectors such as mining;
broadening the taxation base by introducing the personal income tax and removing the
numerous tax exemptions, most of which are dubious. The social security system should also
be reshaped, since it has been draining far more resources than the Romanian economy can
accommodate both at present and in the medium term. Similarly, public-debt-related costs can
be cut down sizably through better management.
55. Income policy can play in turn a major part in the achievement of disinflationary
economic policy. Above all, a more transparent correlation between earnings and output
performance is required. It is highly unlikely that unions will come to terms with privatization
as long as state-run industries offer at the same time a secure job, above-average earnings, and
lavish fringe benefits. Although the authorities seem to be getting the message, a decision has
not been made yet. The experience so far shows that a lasting solution for this challenge
cannot be reached in the absence of privatization.
22
56. This is where we come to the crucial point of economic stabilization, enterprise
reform. Performance of the state-owned enterprises has worsened steadily, as the target-
function of profit maximization receded to the background and was taken over by
maximization of earnings by the rank and file (Dãianu, 1994, Croitoru, 1998). Over and above
that, in time, a perverse mechanism was put in place, through which the substance, i.e., the
profit achieved in the public sector, goes into private hands with the support of managers
against the backdrop of the owner’s feebleness, while losses are borne by taxpayers. In our
opinion, a mere improvement of management in the current status of ownership is not enough
to break the gridlock. The only lasting solution is to accelerate privatization. The success of
both economic stabilization and efforts to prevent inflation require stopping the “bleeding” of
the public sector in the economy. The authors deem that the proponents of restructuring
before privatization are the representatives of vested interests, taking advantage of
circumstances.
57. An essential condition of successful reform in Romania is to improve the
functioning of the financial system. Thus far, one of the chief weaknesses was the operators’
impression that there are only a few rules of the game, the observance of which is optional.
This impression ought to be suppressed, and regulation and supervision of financial institutions
must be enhanced considerably. Parallel to market globalization, the aforesaid effort becomes
crucial to pre-empt turmoil that may end in full-scale crisis. Romania has no choice but to
buck the trend in both banking and other financial institutions as far as they keep developing.
Since the “lion’s share” of the financial market in Romania is currently held by the banks, the
previously mentioned requirements refer, first of all, to them, while the central bank is bound
to fulfill these requirements.
58. Assuming that good progress will be made in the above-mentioned areas, monetary
policy should further identify the ways for disinflation to meet with success. The authors are of
the opinion that the medium-term target can be accomplished more successfully within the
institutional framework provided by an independent central bank empowered to freely draw up
and adjust monetary policy, thus spelling a bias toward discretion rather than precise rules. It
does not mean that the central bank executives aim to provide a legal basis for voluntary
decisions meant to accommodate the inconsistencies of economic policy with monetary policy
measures, but just the possibility to react to expected developments of the monetary
parameters. Hence, once the functioning of the economy has improved and the financial
markets consolidated, a steep increase in the demand for money and financial deepening is
likely to emerge. It takes a proper monetary policy to accommodate this trend.
59. A very fine line exists between voluntary, politically-driven decisions and necessary
monetary accommodation of mounting demand for money. This distinction is more delicate
now, since the initial process of improving economic conditions is about to suffer from the
bias toward premature monetary accommodation. A mechanism that makes the central bank
accountable for the fashion in which it achieves its main goal – control over inflation – can
obviate the menace of voluntarism in the decision-making process. In our opinion, such a
stance will not entail changes to the existing regulatory framework. All it takes is the mere
decision by the NBR Board of Directors to start issuing, on a half-yearly or even quarterly
basis, an inflation report. This measure is expected to strengthen accountability in the central
bank, to render it less vulnerable to political pressures, and to pave the way for assuming an
inflation target in case the European Central Bank opts for such a target.
60. Moreover, the authorities assert that using of the exchange rate as an explicit
anchor by way of a peg cannot be successful in the next few years. The assertion is based on
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lack of credibility, given the recent track record. Two other reasons render the exchange-rate
anchor non-viable: first, prices should stay flexible enough to allow further adjustment of their
relative level; and second, a fixed or pegged rate deprives monetary policy from playing an
active part. In particular, we join Dãianu and Croitoru (1999) in their argument against the
introduction of the Currency Board in Romania; the successful implementation of such a
mechanism is conditional on fulfillment of other conditions than those directly linked to the
parity of the exchange rate. Once all these conditions have been met, a less rigid exchange rate
can serve better a sound, long-lasting economic growth.
61. Construction of monetary policy can be made more successful within the existing
framework, aiming primarily at a monetary target, i.e., the monetary base, which is adjustable
in relation to other essential economic developments. Using the monetary base as an
intermediate target is feasible, since the monetary base multiplier is relatively stable or at least
predictable, and the central bank has nearly real-time information on this aggregate. Thus, it
can intervene promptly to correct unanticipated deviations. In assessing the quantitative
targets of monetary base growth, the central bank should consider the following: the change in
currency in circulation (which stays on a downward trend in relation both to other monetary
aggregates and to the nominal GDP); the rise in the monetary base multiplier; and the rise in
demand for money. To confirm the appropriateness of the base money level, the NBR can
resort to interest rates on the interbank market, as well as to forex market developments, both
available in real time. These developments, at least in the last six months, look set to provide
more accurate information on the consistency of monetary policy.
62. The above-described scenario should represent an optimal formula for sustaining
the progress of reform and for expediting integration with the European Union. Nonetheless
one may ask, “Which should be the most adequate monetary policy stance in case of a less
supportive policy mix applied by the authorities?” Should these deviations be relatively
narrow, and pose no threat to the overall macroeconomic environment, monetary policy can
be built on the same basic principles, and it must only answer the question of whether the
disinflation process can be continued at the same pace as envisaged in the best-case scenario.
An answer in the affirmative would imply a monetary tightening that obviates the slower
recovery of the demand for money. Pursuant to this scenario, economic growth is also
expected to be more moderate, owing to reform slowdown rather than a monetary tightening.
Should the central bank estimate that the quantitative anti-inflationary target might lose
credibility, even amid tighter monetary conditions, it is much more important to fend off the
swings that occurred so far than to pursue and ultimately miss an overly ambitious target. It is
worth mentioning that the central bank has adequate tools to adjust monetary policy according
to the actual circumstances.
63. It is our belief that over a time horizon of five to seven years the objective of
lowering annual inflation to the mid-low digit area is within reach. Consequently, the issue of
putting the spotlight on exchange rate stabilization may arise. Such a change is unavoidable
once an advanced stage in the process of European integration has been reached. The success
of this process and the pace to be set hinge critically on the government’s capability to
implement decisive structural reforms now.
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